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South Sudan
Constitutional confusion around revenue roles is a recipe for 
conflict
Let’s talk about tax
Matthew S. Benson
South Sudan, the world’s newest state, is also one of its most fra- gile. Repeated international attempts to end the country’s civil war, which broke out in December 2013, have failed with predictable 
regularity. Meanwhile, ongoing violence has forced nearly 2m people to 
flee their homes, according to March 2015 estimates from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit.
Against this backdrop—of seemingly never-ending violence and politi-
cal posturing—unresolved questions about intra-governmental relation-
ships and constitutional fine print are easily ignored.  
Yet these questions will need to be addressed if a peaceful South Suda-
nese state, accountable and responsive to its citizens, is ever to arise.  
A series of disputes between state governors and South Sudan’s central 
finance ministry since independence in 2011 are indicative of a larger con-
stitutional challenge—confusion around fiscal decentralisation.
South Sudan is divided into ten states, carved from three historic for-
mer provinces and contemporary regions—Bahr el Ghazal in the north-
west, Equatoria in the south, and Greater Upper Nile in the north-east. 
The disagreements have featured state governors and finance minis-
ters, especially those from states that produce oil or host trade routes, re-
fusing to remit funds to the central government. 
Oil is the backbone of the country’s economy. Even with war curbing oil 
production, petroleum accounted for approximately 50% of the country’s 
GDP in 2014, according to the latest IMF estimates. 
Clement Wani Konga, governor of Central Equatoria, has been one 
of the loudest voices critical of South Sudan’s tax collection system. Mr 
Konga’s disaffection dates back to October 2012, when he made public 
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statements—picked up by local newspapers—blaming a corrupt central 
revenue-collection system for financial losses in his state.
In turn, the central finance ministry has harboured suspicions about 
state-level corruption. Revenue collection at state level is crooked “across 
the board”, James Wani Igga, South Sudan’s vice-president told local 
media last year. 
The central government cited state-level sleaze as a reason for any re-
mittance delays and used this pretext in May 2012 to centralise revenue 
collection, taking this power away from states.
The problem lies partly in South Sudan’s 2011 transitional constitution, 
which does not clearly delineate fiscal decentralisation obligations.  
South Sudan’s transitional constitution was fostered under the provi-
sions of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which helped 
pave the way for the country’s 2011 independence. This interim document 
calls for a constitutional commission to draft a permanent constitution 
through a consultative process initially scheduled to end roughly a year 
after independence. This process has stalled and a permanent constitution 
is yet to be ratified. 
According to part 12, chapter 4 of the transitional constitution, both 
states and the national government have the right to levy taxes in South 
Sudan. Additional national and state-level taxation powers are laid out in 
the Tax Act and the Local Governance Act, which both date back to 2009. 
Clashes over tax revenues are woven in the region’s history. Before the 
CPA, as Douglas Johnson explains in his 2014 book “Federalism in the 
History of South Sudanese Political Thought”, the Khartoum government 
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maintained power in part by granting the southern region the autonomy 
to deliver public services while simultaneously maintaining a stranglehold 
on the fiscal levers.
Both the central and state governments have a lot to lose. Central Equa-
toria benefits from the trade that flows from Uganda to the capital Juba, 
whereas commerce from Sudan has historically flowed into northern 
Bahr el-Ghazal.
In the midst of the constitutional confusion, poorly trained tax admin-
istrators have been knowingly or unwittingly breaking the country’s tax 
laws. The problem lies with the interim constitution, the Local Govern-
ment Act and the Tax Act, which do not clearly define which level of gov-
ernment has the power to collect different types of taxes. Moreover, budg-
et-squeezed law enforcement officers are also infamous for collecting illicit 
taxes from traders within states.  
In November traders protested in Wau, a city in western Bahr el-Ghaz-
al, claiming that taxes are levied unfairly or ad hoc at multiple collection 
points, according to the UNICEF-linked Catholic Radio Network, based 
in Juba. Similar protests also erupted in Eastern Equatoria’s Torit shortly 
after independence.  
The region’s shifting history accounts for much of the confusion. While 
South Sudan may be the world’s newest country, state-building attempts 
are taking place within the confining legacy of previous efforts. 
These include Khartoum’s endeavours before South Sudan’s independ-
ence in 2011 as well as those of British colonial officials when then-unified 
Sudan was known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Before oil was 
discovered in the southern territory that is now South Sudan in the early 
1970s, the region was neither profitable for the British nor the Khartoum 
regime that followed. 
Moreover, given the legacy of economic underdevelopment that south-
ern Sudan experienced under both the British and the northern Suda-
nese, the country’s persistent reliance on oil and imports for revenue is 
understandable. 
As a result, there are simply too few, if any, domestic sectors to tax 
other than oil. And while some communities pay “in-kind” taxes through 
grain, the formal tax system does not capture most citizens. According to a 
2011 World Bank report, 80% of southern Sudanese work in the informal 
economy.
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Administrative confusion, particularly around the quasi-military op-
erations that continue to collect illicit taxes, also makes historical sense. 
Rebel groups demanded payments during the civil wars that led to South 
Sudan’s independence, as Mr Johnson spells out in his book, “The Root 
Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars”. 
Following the outbreak of violence in December 2013, debates around 
federalism—and the most effective way to structure power between the 
central government and the states—have captured the hearts and minds of 
many in South Sudan.
Unfortunately, these debates focus too narrowly on political considera-
tions and neglect broader questions about continuing revenue disputes 
and fiscal decentralisation. 
This omission is logical because southern Sudan has historically de-
pended on limited tax revenue, and ending violence between warring par-
ties is an obvious priority. But taxes are the lynchpin to forging a social 
contract between citizens and the state and also critical to maintaining a 
healthy balance of power. This oversight needs to be rectified.  
Other African constitutions such as those of Kenya, Rwanda and South 
Africa have tackled fiscal decentralisation. These charters might hold an-
swers for South Sudan, argues Biong Kual Deng, a former representative 
with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
an inter-governmental body helping to draft a permanent constitution. 
The enduring conflict has drastically reduced oil production and the 
subsequent much-needed government revenue. An unseen benefit may 
arise as the debate shifts to ending this reliance and exploring how to gen-
erate other sources of revenue, particularly from the informal economy.
Moreover, emergent research argues that when firms in the informal 
economy pay taxes, a greater share of the population engages with the 
state, which in turn increases political accountability and responsiveness.
Buyers of South Sudan’s oil and debt—which notably include China, 
and international donors such as Norway, the UK and the US, are the 
country’s remaining fiscal lifelines. The tensions are unlikely to subside 
unless all parties—including the state, citizens, international donors and 
the creditors and buyers of South Sudan’s oil—bring tax into the conversa-
tion. This means clarifying its role within the constitution and ensuring 
that tax policy is accurately reflected on the ground.
